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PRESCIENCE AND PROVIDENCE: 
A REPLY TO MY CRITICS 
David P. Hunt 
I respond to the two critiques of my position on the providential usefulness 
of simple foreknowledge. Professor Kapitan objects that I have not directly 
addressed his main argument against deliberating while holding a belief about 
the outcome of the deliberation. Perhaps he is right; in any event, I address 
that argument here and find it wanting. Professor Basinger focuses his attack 
on my scenario for divine decision-making. I reply that he has misunderstood 
the role of that scenario, that his proffered counterexample fails, and that it 
would not refute my position even if it succeeded. 
I am delighted that my defense of the traditional view on providence and 
foreknowledge has attracted the attention of two of the most able spokesmen 
for the opposing view. I am not much persuaded by what they say on behalf 
of the new consensus, but I welcome the opportunity offered by their remarks 
to extend and clarify my own position. 
Let me begin with the essay by Professor Kapitan. The bulk of his paper 
is devoted to what I shall refer to as his "main argument" in support of the 
Doxastic Principle; this is followed by a restatement of his position on a key 
example discussed in my paper, and the application of his main argument to 
my suggested scenario for divine decision-making. I shall take these in re-
verse order. 
My only comment on Kapitan's discussion of my decision-making scenario 
is that he is wrong to read it as a process that occurs over time. The scenario 
merely sets forth the order of dependence among the key elements in God's 
practical reasoning: the initial conditional decisions, simple foreknowledge, 
practical conclusions, and providential acts. The relations of logical priority 
among these items are independent of whether they subsist in time or in some 
eternal present. The latter is immune to Kapitan's critique; as for the former, 
my response will have to await an examination of Kapitan's main argument. 
If Kapitan has misinterpreted my account of divine decision-making, I am 
prepared to allow that I have misinterpreted his position on Quinn's Smith-
White example. He denies holding the view I attributed to him, according to 
which a conditional decision is merely implemented when its antecedent is 
satisfied; instead, he asserts that antecedent-satisfaction is the occasion for a 
distinct decision, guided by the original conditional decision. If this is his 
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view, however, we must ask whether it is consistent with his support for the 
Doxastic Principle. 
Assuming that two decisions are made by Smith with regard to White's 
invitation, how should these decisions be characterized? The obvious answer 
is that they are of the following form (the phrase in square brackets indicating 
the content of the decision): 
Decision I: X decides at II [to do A if C obtains]. 
Decision II: X decides at h (when C obtains) [to do A]. 
But if we accept this characterization of the two decisions, Kapitan's thesis 
requires not only that no belief about Decision I should immediately precede 
that decision, but that no belief about Decision II should immediately precede 
that decision. Now if X comes to believe subsequent to Decision I but prior 
to the obtaining of C that C will obtain, and on this basis comes to believe 
further that he will do A (since Decision I has already been made and is thus 
available for inference), then it seems that X might hold an immediately prior 
belief about a decision that has not yet been made (since Decision II occurs 
when C obtains, and C does not yet obtain). Clearly the game is lost for 
Kapitan if he does not do something about Decision II. 
If I now understand him correctly, his response is not to replace Decision 
II with a non-decision (e.g., a mere implementation); rather, it is to replace 
Decision II with another decision, perhaps 
Decision III: X decides at tJ (when X comes to believe that C will obtain) 
[to do A when C obtains]. 
This decision comes before or simultaneous with the belief, not later. If this 
is Kapitan's position, our disagreement is really over whether there are any 
cases of X coming to believe prior to t2 that he will do A which follow the 
Decision 1+11 model, or whether all cases of this type conform to the Decision 
I+III model. My own view is that, while the Smith-White case might plausibly 
be assimilated to the 1+111 model, Sally's case is most naturally interpreted 
as belonging to the 1+11 variety. Sally has committed herself to making a 
decision which depends on the toss of the coin. If this commitment is suffi-
ciently strong to survive the foreknowledge that she will decide in favor of 
Chester (as I see no reason for denying), then she will make a decision whose 
form will correspond to Decision II rather than Decision III. But a full defense 
of this view (which I am undertaking elsewhere) would take me beyond the 
page limits which the Editor has imposed on my reply, so I shall turn now to 
an examination of Kapitan's main argument. 
I should first of all note that the objection Kapitan raises against my for-
mulation of (DP) is of course correct, and I am willing to accept his (DP*) 
in the role I had assigned to (DP).l At the same time, none of the objections 
to (DP) in my original paper is traceable to the flaw which Kapitan identifies 
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and corrects in moving to (DP*); insofar as I have succeeded in raising any 
doubts about (DP), then, those doubts are inherited by (DP*). Kapitan under-
stands this, and therefore undertakes to layout a positive case for (DP*), one 
which rests on two planks. The first is (DO), the principle that decision-
making presupposes a belief in the openness of the future-what I shall refer 
to as doxastic openness. The second is a particular account of what doxastic 
openness involves. I have no quarrel with (DO), which is why (as Kapitan 
correctly notes) I never contest it in my paper. My problem concerns Kapitan's 
account of doxastic openness. 
Kapitan begins his account unexceptionably enough: for an action A to be 
doxastically open for an agent X at time t, X must presume or take himself 
to believe both (i) that his A-ing or not A-ing is dependent on his decision, 
and (ii) that his decision is still (at t) contingent. Now if the presumption of 
doxastic openness, so understood, is to prevent the agent from simultaneously 
holding an (accessed) belief about his future action, it is hard to see how 
clause (i) could be the source of the trouble. If X believes that he will A, he 
may further believe that he will A because he will decide to A, in which case 
clause (i) would be satisfied. If such beliefs necessarily preclude doxastic 
openness, it must be owing to clause (ii). And indeed, this appears to be 
Kapitan's view as well, since he focuses his defense of (DP*) on the proper 
construal of 'contingency' and its implications. 
What we learn about 'contingency' as it appears in clause (ii) is that it is 
not a mere logical or nomological modality; rather, it is a relative modality, 
meaning that the contingency in question is relative to some set of proposi-
tions S. But the mere fact that p is noncontingent relative to some S is hardly 
sufficient to render p doxastically closed, for there is always an S (e.g., {p}) 
with respect to which p is noncontingent; it is also necessary that the propo-
sitions constituting S, with respect to which X believes his decision to be 
noncontingent, should be relevant to the issue of doxastic openness. Kapitan 
identifies the relevant S as propositions about "prevailing circumstances" or 
"circumstances as they now stand." He is right to qualify S in this way, for 
obvious reasons. Propositions about circumstances which do not yet obtain 
are simply irrelevant to what is contingent now. By restricting S to "prevail-
ing" circumstances, Kapitan appears to be rejecting the blandishments of 
fatalism, which regards all circumstances (including those that will not pre-
vail until some future date) as relevant to determining what lies open. Apply-
ing this understanding of relative contingency to clause (ii), Kapitan therefore 
concludes that "an agent takes a course of action to be open only by assuming 
that both it and its complement are possible given circumstances as they now 
stand [emphases added]."2 
I am simply at a loss how it is that Kapitan moves from this conception of 
doxastic openness to the claim at the end of the succeeding paragraph that 
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"a suitably rational and self-reflective agent who already believes that he will 
do A takes the future to the 'fixed' or 'settled' with respect to his A-ing, not 
'open. "'3 Kapitan's own analysis of doxastic openness rightly restricts the 
relevant beliefs to those about circumstances as they now stand, and the belief 
that one will do A is not a belief about circumstances as they now stand; 
therefore it cannot compel a "suitably rational and self-reflective agent" to 
regard the future as "fixed" or "settled" rather than "open." Any agent who 
arrived at such a conclusion would only be demonstrating his susceptibility 
to the modal fallacies underlying fatalism. While some agents might make 
(and indeed have made) such a mistake, we can be confident that an inerrant 
deity would never be deceived in this way. 
In light of the foregoing, I see no reason to retract what I said in my original 
paper: 
But why must Sally's belief that she will marry Chester undermine her belief 
in an open future? She has no grounds for supposing that she must marry 
Chester, or that she can 'f pursue another course of action. If she nevertheless 
looks upon her future as closed, it only proves that she is as credulous about 
fatalism as she is about fortune-tellers. 4 
The failure of Kapitan's main argument simply reinforces the point. 
I turn now to the essay by Professor Basinger, which focuses exclusively 
on the conditional decision scenario (or 'CDS,' as I shall now refer to it) to 
be found at the end of my paper. He unfortunately begins by misrepresenting 
my position, perhaps not altogether culpably, and while this mistake does not 
directly affect his argument it is nevertheless worth correcting. He apparently 
understands me to be accepting both the Metaphysical and the Doxastic 
Problem as genuine, and then introducing the CDS as a way to "circumvent" 
these problems. Now Basinger is partially correct regarding my position on 
the Metaphysical Problem: my whole approach to that problem in the paper 
is to grant the Metaphysical Principle and then show how God can circumvent 
it. But he is only partially correct: the fact that I grant the principle for the 
sake of argument does not mean that I believe it to be true, and my favorable 
reference to David Lewis's view of the matter should indicate that I share his 
doubts. Basinger is not even partially correct regarding my position on the 
Doxastic Problem, since I explicitly reject the Doxastic Principle upon which 
that problem rests. I will nevertheless accept a small measure of blame if the 
following speculation about the source of Basinger's error is accurate. 
It may have seemed to Basinger, first, that the CDS does circumvent, or at 
any rate is designed to circumvent, the Doxastic Problem; and second, that 
there could be no point to my circumventing this problem if I did not regard 
it as genuine. But neither of these premises is correct. In the first place, the 
only feature of the CDS which might suggest that it circumvents the Doxastic 
Problem is that it locates a key providential decision prior to the exercise of 
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divine foreknowledge (while preserving a useful role for foreknowledge with 
respect to a subsequent decision). But this suggestion is misleading, since the 
CDS concerns only logical priority, while the Doxastic Principle is a thesis 
regarding temporal priority. Thus God's knowledge and decisions may be 
logically related in the manner set forth in the CDS while remaining tempo-
rally related in the way proscribed by the Doxastic Principle. And indeed this 
is the case: though the foreknowledge of an eternally omniscient Deity may 
be logically subsequent to His conditional decisions, He nevertheless pos-
sesses that foreknowledge while making those decisions. This is just what the 
Doxastic Principle rules out. So the CDS, despite appearances, offers nothing 
to vitiate a direct conflict with the Doxastic Principle. Kapitan at least un-
derstands this, since he justifies his dismissal of the CDS by referring back 
to his earlier defense of the Doxastic Principle. Quite right: if the Doxastic 
Principle is true, omniprescient deliberation is a lost cause-at least nothing 
in the CDS can serve to rehabilitate it. 
In the second place, since I do not offer the CDS as a means of circum-
venting the Doxastic Problem, there must be some other point to that scenario. 
But what is that point? It is here that I am willing to share some of the blame 
with Basinger, for I see now that the point of the CDS is not made sufficiently 
clear in the paper, and Basinger may not be the only reader who inferred a 
point different from the one I intended. So let me clear up the confusion 
forthwith. At the juncture where I introduce the CDS I regard myself (rightly 
or wrongly) as having already shown that the Metaphysical Problem (whether 
genuine or not) is circumventable, and that the Doxastic Problem (whether 
circumventable or not) is not genuine. But these results are purely negative, 
and I wanted to conclude the paper with some positive suggestion for how 
God might put His foreknowledge to providential use, given the maneuvering 
room opened up by my critique of the Metaphysical and Doxastic Problems. 
This is the role I intended the CDS to play in the paper. If it succeeds in this 
role, it is pure gain, while if it does not succeed, my basic argument against 
the new consensus remains unaffected. 
So there is less riding on the CDS than Basinger supposes. I am neverthe-
less prepared to defend it. Basinger develops his argument through an analy-
sis of a test case involving a young woman named 'Sue' who prays for 
guidance regarding a marriage proposal from a young man named 'Tom.' 
Basinger employs this case, not on behalf of the two problems I address in 
the paper (which he claims I have successfully circumvented), but in order 
to raise a new problem. As he sees it, the price of avoiding the Metaphysical 
and Doxastic Problems by adopting a conditional decision strategy is that 
divine actions guided by this strategy cannot increase God's providential 
control. In order for the CDS to make a genuine contribution toward God's 
providential ends, the antecedents describing the conditions under which God 
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would respond in the ways set forth in the consequents must include infor-
mation sufficient for God to judge that there is some point to His intervention. 
In the case of Sue and Tom, for example, the mere fact that Tom will die in 
a tragic auto accident is insufficient: the antecedent must be enriched to 
include information connecting Tom's death with some good to be achieved 
(or evil avoided) through God's advising Sue to reject his proposal. Basin-
ger's contention is that when all providentially relevant information is packed 
into the antecedent, the CDS collapses. 
Before seeing how Basinger backs up this charge, I wish to note that he is 
absolutely correct in pointing out that the antecedents employed in the CDS 
may often require considerable enrichment before becoming providentially 
useful. (The antecedent of Basinger's Dl, for instance, surely needs to be 
fleshed out with information about the kind of person Sue is.) I did not go 
into this in my paper because it did not seem to me that anything in my 
argument hinged on whether those conditional decisions were simple or com-
plex. It is certainly open to a critic to argue that I was wrong in this assump-
tion; but Basinger's argument to this effect is unpersuasive on a number of 
counts. 
Basinger proposes two ways that God's conditional decision regarding His 
advice to Sue might be rendered providentially useful. The first of these, 
expressed in Basinger's D2, is to include in the antecedent information about 
the outcome of God's decision-making. Does He end up advising Sue against 
marriage? If so, does Sue accept and act on His advice? Does her action 
conduce toward the good that God desires for her (and others)? But this way 
of saving the CDS won't work, Basinger argues, because divine knowledge 
of such an antecedent (enriched with answers to these questions) must conflict 
with divine agency. It is incompatible with God's action resulting from a 
decision, for this implies the possibility of God deciding otherwise, and "even 
God is not free to do what he knows he will not do";5 and it is incompatible 
with God's action increasing His providential control, for He already knows 
whether His purposes will be advanced, and any action He might take in light 
of that knowledge is therefore pointless: if what He knows is that His ends 
will not be achieved, then providential intervention in the situation must be 
inefficacious, and if what He knows is that His ends will be achieved, this 
will happen "regardless of the type of activity D2 directs God to implement."6 
I confess that I find this part of Basinger's argument a bit baffling. The 
outcome of God's decision-making, which Basinger regards as "relevant in-
formation," strikes me as utterly irrelevant-at least I can't imagine what it 
is supposed to be relevant for. Presumably what counts in this context is 
relevance for divine decision-making. This is enhanced when the antecedents 
of the CDS are enriched with reasons for God to perform the actions de-
scribed in the consequents. But the fact that God will do A cannot be a reason 
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for His deciding to do A. How then could knowledge of this fact enhance 
God's providential position? This strategy for antecedent enrichment is sim-
ply a non-starter. 
Basinger, of course, introduces this strategy in order to show that it is 
unavailable to me. He is right about this, but only for the reason just adum-
brated, not for the reasons that he himself cites. His first reason, that "even 
God is not free to do what he knows he will not do," I assume to be an instance 
of the more general claim that 
(1) x is not free to do what x knows he [x] will not do, 
rather than 
(2) x is not free to do what God knows x will not do. 
These point to distinct foreknowledge problems, and (2) is neither addressed 
in my paper nor possessed of the uncontroversial character which would 
allow Basinger to cite it so confidently in support of his position.7 (1), how-
ever, is simply false: surely I can know that I will eat tomorrow without 
thereby losing the freedom to refrain from eating tomorrow. What Basinger 
presumably has in mind here is rather 
(1') x cannot decide to do what x knows he [x] will not do. 
But Basinger never explains why this principle ought to be accepted. He could 
perhaps point to (DP) (or (DP*» and urge that (1') be accepted on the same 
grounds, but the cogency of these grounds is precisely what is in dispute. 
Basinger cannot hope to confute my position simply by reaffirming the very 
principle that I reject. 
His second reason for dismissing D2, as we saw, is that foreknowledge of 
its antecedent cannot increase God's providential control. But we must ask: 
increase beyond what? If the benchmark is simply what will be, then of course 
it is impossible for God to use His foreknowledge to exceed this benchmark; 
but this is only because it is impossible for anyone to bring about a state-of-
affairs consisting of the future being different from what it will be, an im-
possibility that has nothing to do with foreknowledge and the alleged 
uselessness thereof. If, on the other hand, the benchmark is what would have 
been, then Basinger offers no reason for thinking that God could not draw 
on His foreknowledge to exceed this benchmark: if the antecedent conditions 
that God foreknows to obtain include both the fact that Tom will die a tragic 
death and the fact that the best for Sue will come about, the latter may be the 
happy result of God having used His foreknowledge of the former to advise 
Sue against marriage, thus constituting a providential gain over the result that 
would have obtained if God had not relied on His foreknowledge to advise 
Sue as He did. Basinger's mistake here is reminiscent of the fallacy in one 
of the classic arguments for fatalism: either I will be hit by a car while 
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crossing this street, or I won't; if I will, any precautions I take will be 
ineffective; if I won't, any precautions I take will be unnecessary; therefore 
it is pointless to take precautions. While this fallacious instance of Construc-
tive Dilemma involves antecedent truth and Basinger's involves antecedent 
knowledge, I see nothing in Basinger's argument to show why this should 
make a difference. If antecedent truth does not render precautions pointless, 
it is unclear why knowledge of antecedent truth should persuade a rational 
agent that precautions are pointless. 
So the antecedent enrichment strategy offered by D2 does not rule out 
enhancement of divine decision-making, as Basinger avers. Its real problem, 
as I pointed out, is that it misidentifies the sort of information that would 
lead to a real improvement in God's providential position. What D3 offers is 
at least relevant to this end, so Basinger's critique of this strategy is a rather 
more serious affair. 
D3 replaces information about what will result from God's decision on 
advising Sue with information about what God might reasonably expect to 
result from His decision. Basinger expresses this information prob-
abilistically, enriching the antecedent of D3 with 
(3) If Sue refuses Tom's proposal, what is best for her will probably come 
about. 
Now Basinger's critique of this strategy may be formulated in the following 
way. Exactly one of these four propositions must be true: 
(4) Sue refuses Tom's proposal and what is best for her comes about. 
(4') Sue refuses Tom's proposal and what is best for her does not come 
about. 
(5) Sue does not refuse Tom's proposal and what is best for her comes about. 
(5') Sue does not refuse Tom's proposal and what is best for her does not 
come about. 
God therefore knows one of these propositions to be true. Suppose it is (4) 
or (4'). But if God believes either of these propositions, He cannot also 
believe (3): knowledge of what will be must override beliefs about what will 
probably be. Suppose then that God believes either (5) or (5'). This is com-
patible with His also believing (3); unfortunately, He knows (in virtue of 
knowing (5) or (5'» that (3) is providentially irrelevant. So whichever of 
these propositions God believes, He cannot draw upon (3) in order to enhance 
His providential control. 
Basinger's treatment of (5) and (5') involves him in the same fallacy we 
exposed in discussing D2. The fact that I do not take precautions in crossing 
the street does not make it practically irrelevant that, were I to take precau-
tions, I would probably get to the other side safely. Likewise the fact that Sue 
does not refuse Tom's proposal does not make it providentially irrelevant that, 
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were Sue to refuse his proposal, what is best for her would probably come 
about (indeed, if Sue accepts the proposal, it may be because God refrained 
from advising her against it). So if (3) is true, then whether or not Sue refuses 
(and God knows that she refuses), God has the power, through advising Sue 
against marriage, to bring about conditions in which the achievement of His 
providential ends is more likely. What more is required for God's foreknowl-
edge of Tom's death to be providentially useful? 
So much for (5) and (5'). Basinger's treatment of (4) and (4'), however, 
involves him in some new mistakes. I shall mention three. 
(i) We ordinarily accept as true such statements as 
(6) There is a probability of 1/6 that this die will come up 6 on the next 
throw, 
while granting that either 
(7) This die will come up 6 on the next throw 
or 
(7') It is not the case that this die will come up 6 on the next throw 
is also true. But if (6) and (7) may both be true, why not (3) and (4)? If (6) 
and (7'), why not (3) and (4')? Of course, if probability is an ineluctably 
epistemic notion, it may not be possible to believe both members of these 
pairs. But Basinger gives no reasons for adopting this interpretation of prob-
ability as it functions in (3). 
(ii) Even if he could defend the concept of probability required by his 
argument, it would be irrelevant to the CDS. Suppose, e.g., that (6) and (7) 
are not cotenable; the latter will still be cotenable with 
(6*) There is a probability of 1/6 that a fair 6-sided die will come up 6 on 
the next throw. 
And even if (3) and (4) are not cotenable, the latter is surely cotenable with 
(3*) If someone with properties P, ... Pj avoids marriage under conditions 
C, ... Ck, what is best for that person will probably come about. 
But it is (3*), not (3), which is at work in the CDS. God's conditional 
decisions are reached logically prior to the actualization of a particular world, 
and thus must contain general terms rather than proper names. When reparsed 
in this way, the antecedents of D3 will all be accessible to divine belief 
despite God's knowledge of (4) or (4'). 
(iii) Basinger actually argues as follows: 
To believe that something will quite probably come about-as opposed to 
knowing with certainty that it will come about-is to acknowledge that it is 
possible that it might not come about. But if God knows in W that Sue will 
in fact refuse Tom's proposal and that it will in fact be best that she did, then 
PRESCIENCE AND PROVIDENCE 
God cannot simultaneously believe in W that it is even possible that what is 
best for Sue might not in fact come about if the proposal is refused. 8 
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But Basinger is stepping here into another fatalistic trap. The usual "branch-
ing" view of the future, accepted by libertarians and (most) determinists alike, 
is that while a particular future will be actual, alternative futures are never-
theless (at least logically) possible. Now if this is true, why can't God believe 
it~' Why can't God believe both that Sue refuses and prospers in the actual 
world and that she refuses and languishes in some merely possible world? 
Basinger seems to be saying that God cannot believe both these things be-
cause they are not jointly true: if something will be the case, then it's not 
even possible that it not be the case. But then Basinger is a fatalist. 
So there are a number of ways in which D3 can evade Basinger's attack. 
He could always mount a new attack, perhaps meeting with greater success. 
But even if he managed to show that God's simple foreknowledge is provi-
dentially impotent in the case of Sue and Tom, he would still have to show 
that this is a representative case if he is to generalize from it to the conclusion 
that my defense of the traditional view is "flawed in principle." This is 
impossible, however, since his example is not representative. A significant 
feature of Basinger's example is that God's purpose in acting as He does is 
achieved only if (i) His action leads to something else (beyond the action 
itself), and (ii) other agents are cooperative. Will Sue take God's advice? 
That's up to Sue, not God. Will acting on God's advice conduce toward Sue's 
good? That too depends on how Sue responds to the conditions in which she 
finds herself. God cannot control the choices of other free agents so long as 
He elects to respect their freedom, and this limit on God's omnipotence is 
quite independent of any alleged inadequacies in simple foreknowledge. It 
seems to me, however, that it is this special feature of Basinger's case that 
leads to whatever difficulties it actually presents for divine control. That this 
is so can be seen by considering providential interventions which lack this 
element. Alongside Basinger's test case let us place: 
(8) Sue is a contestant on a game show. God foresees that she will choose 
Door #3; He therefore manipulates events so that the Grand Prize is 
placed behind that door. 
(9) Knowing that an unstable general is about to order a full-scale nuclear 
attack, God channels the acid runoff from a nearby toxic waste dump 
so that it eats through the telephone cables underneath the Presidential 
Palace and the general's order is never received. 
(10) God wishes that the lost Ark of the Covenant not be found again until 
the Second Coming. Foreseeing that no one will ever look inside a 
particular cave in the side of a wadi not far from Jerusalem, He con-
trives to have the Ark slip from its litter and tumble into that very cave 
while a small band of Israelites spirits it away from their enemies under 
cover of darkness. 
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(11) In an early challenge to God's supremacy not recorded in the Bible, 
Satan foolishly proposes to settle the matter with a game of rock-scissors-
paper. Anticipating every choice that Satan will make, God manages 
not to lose a single round. 
Basinger's objections appear to be altogether inappropriate to these cases. I 
conclude that he has not even come close to showing that his example of Sue 
and Tom is representative of all cases of providential intervention guided by 
simple foreknowledge; nor do I think that his analysis works even in this 
favored case, as I have argued at length. 
In closing, I reaffirm the position defended in my original paper. Near the 
beginning of that paper, in discussing some red herrings that can divert 
attention from the real problems of prescience and providence, I noted the 
temptation to engage in fatalistic ways of thinking. Unless I have seriously 
misread them, the responses of my two critics illustrate how easy it is to 
succumb to this temptation. 
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